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TWO FEDERALIST CONSTITUTIONS OF EMPIRE
Gregory Ablavsky*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, I have written a series of articles and a book on
the legal history of the United States in the 1780s and 1790s, focusing
particularly on federal governance.1 This research took me into many
Federalists’ writings; alongside the works of well-known figures, like George
Washington and Alexander Hamilton, I read the papers of cabinet officials,
like Secretaries of War Henry Knox and James McHenry, Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering, and Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott, as well as
more local officials, like Governor Arthur St. Clair and Secretary Winthrop
Sargent of the Northwest Territory. These men all identified as Federalists
in both of the term’s political connotations in the early United States: all first
advocated for the newly drafted Constitution during the heated battle for
ratification and then became partisans of the nascent political party dominant
in the Washington and John Adams administrations.2
What united these disparate men’s thought and made them Federalists
twice over was commitment to federal power. All of them believed in the
need for a newly constituted and strengthened federal government, and all
fought fiercely to establish and defend federal authority. Why and to what
end? What was the new “general,” “national,” or “federal” government, as
it was interchangeably called at the time, for? Although my research has
* Associate Professor of Law and, by courtesy, of History, Stanford Law School. This Essay
was prepared for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham
Law Review on October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan
Gienapp, Rick Hills, and Daniel J. Hulsebosch for comments on this work.
1. See generally GREGORY ABLAVSKY, FEDERAL GROUND: GOVERNING PROPERTY AND
VIOLENCE IN THE FIRST U.S. TERRITORIES (2021); Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Northwest Ordinance, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1631 (2019) [hereinafter
Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism]; Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian
Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012 (2015); Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The
Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019); Gregory Ablavsky, Species of
Sovereignty: Native Nationhood, the United States, and International Law, 1783–1795, 106
J. AM. HIST. 591 (2019) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty]; Gregory Ablavsky,
The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 631 (2018); Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage
Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Savage Constitution]; Gregory
Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional
Meaning, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025 (2018).
2. On these meanings of “Federalist,” see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE
DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 92–95 (2010); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 97–138 (2009).
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addressed disparate topics in present-day law—property, international law,
federal Indian law, federalism, and administrative law—this question has
been at the center of all this work. I looked for the answer not just in
ratification and congressional debates but in the practices of everyday
governance, which persuaded me that scholars have overlooked how much
federal power was shaped by ad hoc negotiation and politicking. This work
also led me to focus on places and areas of law that current constitutional law
often deems marginal or exceptional: the U.S. territories, federal lands, and
relations between the United States and Native nations. But for late
eighteenth-century Federalists, these issues were central, arguably even core,
to the federal government’s purpose.
One straightforward answer that this research revealed is that the new
federal government was for empire: the new United States was an imperial
state that self-consciously sought to assume many of the responsibilities and
powers of its British predecessor.3 But empires, as a wealth of recent
scholarship underscores, are complicated and multifaceted.4 I quickly
discovered the existence of at least two distinct imperial Federalist
constitutions, both with roots in prerevolutionary practice and thought.
Both constitutions embraced expanded federal power but sought to use it
for divergent ends. One constitution sought to use federal authority to
discipline recalcitrant states and U.S. citizens, whose selfish and shortsighted
behavior, Federalists believed, jeopardized national interests, especially the
new nation’s relations with other sovereigns.5 The second sought to wield
the nation’s bolstered financial and military resources against perceived
external threats and enemies.6 In my earlier work on the role of Indian affairs
in the creation of the Constitution, I called these two strands Madisonian and
Hamiltonian, in honor of their principal advocates at the Constitutional
Convention.7 But both visions swept more broadly than either Indian affairs
or the immediate context of the Constitution’s creation and beyond these two
men. Here, I label them as the “constitution of constraint” and the
“constitution of empowerment.”
Like all tidy dichotomies, this approach artificially imposes a sharp divide
on a muddled past. Most self-identified Federalists, especially over the
1790s, embraced both the constitution of constraint and the constitution of
empowerment. Many regarded them as importantly intertwined: many
Federalists adopted a strikingly militaristic approach because they envisioned

3. On the United States as an imperial state, see generally BETHEL SALER, THE SETTLERS’
EMPIRE: COLONIALISM AND STATE FORMATION IN AMERICA’S OLD NORTHWEST (2014);
Gautham Rao, The New Historiography of the Early Federal Government: Institutions,
Contexts, and the Imperial State, 77 WM. & MARY Q. 97 (2020).
4. For a brief overview of an enormous literature, see generally LAUREN A. BENTON, A
SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 (2010);
JANE BURBANK & FREDERICK COOPER, EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE (2010).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part II.
7. Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 1, at 1006–07.
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using a strengthened federal military against both external and internal
challenges to federal power.
The value of this dichotomy, to my mind, lies as much in explaining the
two constitutions’ divergent receptions and fates as it does in illuminating
Federalist thought. One key theme in my research, building on a long line of
scholarship on early American law and politics, is that federal officials,
whether Federalists or their emerging Republican opponents, could not
readily control how federal authority was used.8 Rather, people outside the
federal government routinely seized on Federalist constitutionalism to serve
their own ends. In this Essay, I focus on the region I have studied the most,
the early U.S. territories, which were fractured borderlands where diverse
groups contested for sovereignty and allegiance. Residents’ constitutional
views fell outside the neat partisan categories of Federalist and Republican,
although both parties sought to shape federal power to accommodate these
outsiders’ demands. Native leaders, for instance, actively pressed for the
constitution of constraint, while white territorial citizens whom Federalists
labeled the “lawless inhabitants of the frontiers” readily embraced the
constitution of empowerment.9 In short, like elsewhere in the early United
States—only perhaps more visibly—the struggle over constitutional meaning
in the early territories was a fight over access to power and violence.
We know the end of this story: as Saul Cornell and Gerry Leonard trace
in their impressive recent book, Federalist efforts to distance federal power
from democratic control failed to anticipate the rise of political parties or the
persistence of popular authority, leading Federalists to retreat to the judiciary
to fight a partially successful rearguard action.10 In the process, what I have
dubbed the constitution of constraint largely failed, while the constitution of
empowerment flourished. In the territories, this outcome meant that Native
nations lost, dispossessed by a strengthened federal government placating the
demands of territorial citizens.
This outcome might be deemed a form of popular constitutionalism—
except that this framing, rather than a neutral description, vindicates a
contested constitutional perspective.11 What scholars have labeled popular
constitutionalism presupposes what territorial citizens demanded: that there
was a unified American “people”—implicitly and explicitly coded, as
Cornell and Leonard point out, as white and male12—and that the role of the
federal government was to protect their interests. But the constitution of
8. See generally ABLAVSKY, supra note 1.
9. Letter from Arthur St. Clair to Henry Knox (Apr. 19, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS 174, 174 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1832).
10. GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY,
EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–1830S, at 84–92 (2019).
11. On popular constitutionalism, see generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Saul Cornell, The
People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2011).
12. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 2–3 (noting how advocates of democracy
“explicitly excluded all but white men from civic participation”).
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constraint rested on an alternate vision, embraced by both the Federalists and
Native leaders, in which the federal government was often obligated to
sacrifice the demands of its own citizens to abstractions like the “national
interest” or even “justice.” Early American politics and law together helped
doom this approach.
In one sense, this outcome marked a Federalist failure. It certainly
demonstrated shortsightedness, as Federalists failed to anticipate how poorly
their antidemocratic efforts would fare in a political system in which
opportunities for popular control and dissent remained rife. But, as I have
also stressed in my work, the dominance of the constitution of empowerment
was also a Federalist triumph of a sort.13 Both during and after ratification,
Federalists sold the new Constitution for its promise of empowerment and
then explicitly attempted to curry popular favor in office by deploying federal
power to placate these demands. These efforts were often strategic and
calculating and at times undercut the core aims that Federalists purported to
endorse—and yet they proved consequential. In that sense, though
subsequent constitutional history unfolded in ways that the Federalists did
not envision and anticipate, it was also a future that they chose.
I. CONSTITUTION OF CONSTRAINT
A. Creating the Constitution of Constraint
The key text in the constitution of constraint is perhaps James Madison’s
well-known “Vices of the Political System of the United States.”14 Over
multiple pages, Madison decried excesses and failures that had occurred
under the Articles of Confederation, as he focused on both the failures of the
state governments and the “people themselves.”15 Madison identified the
solution as the creation of a strengthened federal government to impose
checks on both. As many have noted, he embraced an antidemocratic
approach of filtration that would place in office “the purest and noblest
characters.”16 But the core of what I term the “constitution of constraint”
rests in Madison’s observation: “The great desideratum in Government is
such a modification of the Sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral
between the different interests and factions, to control one part of the Society
from invading the rights of another.”17

13. See Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 1; Ablavsky, Savage
Constitution, supra note 1.
14. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (1787), reprinted in
9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 345, 348–58 (Robert A. Rutland
& William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975).
15. Id. at 354.
16. Id. at 357. See generally Jack Rakove, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of
George Washington, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 261, 261–65 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (reviewing
the scholarship and summarizing this view).
17. Madison, supra note 14, at 357 (footnote omitted).
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Much constitutional historiography can be read as an exegesis of
Madison’s “Vices.” Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American Republic, for
instance, emphasizes Madison’s fears of the excesses of state legislatures,
especially their monetary and credit practices, which threatened to trample
economic stability.18 In this reading, the new federal government would
check these impulses—ultimately not through the federal veto on state
actions that Madison sought but instead through the Supremacy Clause as
well as the limitations that Article I, Section 10 imposed on state actions.19
Scholars have fought about this transformation’s meaning—debating how
much Madison’s solicitude for minority rights was at its core a
counterrevolution to protect wealth from democracy—but they have largely
agreed on its contours.20
Other recent work has picked up on another theme prominent in “Vices”:
the failure of the United States to comply with the strictures of the law of
nations.21 Deeply concerned about its precarious sovereign status in the
international community, the new United States sought to win global
recognition by proving itself a “civilized nation,” in the words of Daniel
Hulsebosch and David Golove,22 and a “treaty-worthy nation,” in the
description of Eliga Gould.23 That meant a nation that would keep its word.
But, Madison lamented, the United States under the Articles was not such a
nation, as states routinely flouted both the nascent principles of international
law and the nation’s treaties, especially the Treaty of Paris’s requirement that
the United States restore confiscated Loyalist property.24 Here, too, the
remedy lay in the constitution of constraint: in constitutional provisions that
expanded federal authority and limited state power over foreign relations,
including by making treaties supreme federal law and in creating “impartial
and unbiased” federal courts that would directly enforce treaties and the law
of nations.25

18. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 395–
562 (1969).
19. ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 132–73
(2010).
20. Compare WOOD, supra note 18, with TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE
PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2007),
and WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (2007),
and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2016).
21. For an overview, see generally Max M. Edling, Peace Pact and Nation: An
International Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, 240 PAST & PRESENT 267
(2018).
22. See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The
Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010).
23. ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE 12–13 (2012).
24. See Madison, supra note 14, at 349.
25. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., Chicago, Scott,
Foresman & Co. 1898); see also Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 989–1015.
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Although much of this work has followed Madison’s focus on state
excesses, Madison and others were also concerned about purported popular
lawlessness.26 Between the lines of “Vices”—and explicitly in much
Federalist writing—was deep anxiety over Shays’s Rebellion, the populist
uprising in western Massachusetts against debt collection and state taxes.27
Massachusetts could barely muster the resources to enforce its laws, leading
Madison and others to worry about “internal violence” (including Madison’s
dark acknowledgment of the threat posed by the presence of enslaved African
peoples).28
I found that the constitution of constraint also played a key role in
Federalist thought about the early American west, the vast expanse of land
between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River that Britain had ceded
the United States in the Treaty of Peace, even though it was inhabited almost
exclusively by Native peoples.29 Madison gave some thought to the west; he
was especially concerned by the defiance and recalcitrance of states in socalled “Indian affairs” under the Articles of Confederation, when Georgia,
New York, and North Carolina, all states with vast territorial claims, defied
federal authority as they asserted questionable title.30 Madison even
witnessed such confrontations firsthand at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in
1784, in which state and federal officials, in front of Haudenosaunee
representatives, battled for authority, prompting arrests and counterarrests
that amounted to a comic opera.31
But more attention came from Henry Knox, who, as secretary at war under
the Articles and then secretary of war under the Washington administration,
was charged with overseeing Indian affairs. Knox’s proposed remedy to the
problem of continual violence between Native peoples and Anglo-Americans
was strikingly Madisonian. The United States would enter into treaties with
Native nations creating firm boundaries, which the federal government
would then police with its military. “[T]he administration of indian affairs,”
Knox argued, must be “conducted by fixed principles established by [federal]
Law, and which being published should be rigidly enforced.”32 The problem,
according to Knox, was the absence of a neutral arbiter of these conflicts, a
26. See, e.g., Letter from Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison (Nov. 1, 1783), in 7
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES, supra note 14, at 391, 392 (decrying
the “lawless banditti”). See generally DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED GENTLEMEN & WHITE
SAVAGES: INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER
57–75 (2008) (describing widespread critiques of perceived lawlessness in the 1780s).
27. See generally SEAN CONDON, SHAYS’S REBELLION: AUTHORITY AND DISTRESS IN
POST-REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (2015).
28. See Madison, supra note 14, at 350–51.
29. On Federalist visions for the west, see generally ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE
FRONTIER REPUBLIC: IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS IN THE OHIO COUNTRY, 1780–1825 (1986);
KRISTOPHER MAULDEN, THE FEDERALIST FRONTIER: SETTLER POLITICS IN THE OLD
NORTHWEST, 1783–1840 (2019); Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of
the West in the 1780s, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 179 (1986).
30. Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 1, at 1018–33.
31. Id. at 1021–22.
32. Henry Knox’s Notes on the State of the Frontier, in 5 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 76, 79 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds., 1996).
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role he believed only the federal government could play: “[t]here can be
neither Justice or observance of treaties, where every man claims to be the
sole Judge in his own cause, and the avenger of his own supposed wrongs,”
Knox wrote soon after Washington’s inauguration.33 Instead, federal power
must force both Native peoples and U.S. citizens into obedience:
“[g]overnment must keep them both in awe by a strong hand,” Knox wrote,
“and compel them to be moderate and just.”34
The Constitution and Federalist jurisprudence sought to remedy these
problems. “The United States have, under the constitution, the sole
regulation of Indian affairs, in all matters whatsoever,” Knox insisted,
pointing to the provisions over treaties, the war power, and commerce, which
he believed foreclosed all state involvement.35 Knox helped draft the Trade
and Intercourse Act of 1790,36 a robust assertion of federal power that made
it a federal crime for citizens to murder or steal from Indians in what it called
“Indian country” or to attempt to purchase Native land.37 Later versions
provided for military enforcement, even as Knox fruitlessly sought to create
courts martial to punish offenses against the treaties.38
Moreover, to an underappreciated extent, the creation of the federal
territories itself was part of the constitution of constraint. Over time, many
states had, at federal urging, ceded their western land claims to the federal
government.39 The Constitution specifically blessed sole federal jurisdiction
and title over these ceded lands through the Property Clause,40 which
retroactively authorized the Northwest Ordinance, adopted nearly
simultaneously with the Constitution.41 Later commentators would hail the
Ordinance as a harbinger of democracy for its promise of admission to
statehood, guarantees of fundamental rights, and prohibition on slavery, but
what it created was a strikingly undemocratic form of government that James
Monroe called “a colonial govt similar to that wh[ich] prevail’d in these

33. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 7, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 134, 136.
34. Report of the Secretary at War to Congress (July 10, 1787), in 2 THE TERRITORIAL
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TERRITORY NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO 31, 31
(Clarence Edward Carter ed., 1934) [hereinafter THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS].
35. Henry Knox, Instructions to General Israel Chapin (Apr. 28, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 231, 232.
36. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (repealed).
37. See id.
38. See Intercourse Act (Indian Tribes), ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834); Act of Mar. 30, 1802,
ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1
Stat. 469; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329.
39. See generally PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC:
JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1775–1787 (1983).
40. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
41. Id. For the original text of the Ordinance, see 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 334–43 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936). The Ordinance was reenacted after the
Constitution’s ratification with minor changes to conform to the new constitutional system.
See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 50, 51–53.
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States previous to the revolution.”42 The law placed sole power over the
territories with federally appointed officials, while largely depriving
territorial residents of all rights to vote or meaningful representation, leading
those who lived under the Ordinance’s strictures to denounce it as “impolitic,
arbitrary, oppressive and tyrannical.”43 This heavy-handed federal rule,
observers have noted, exemplified a Federalist vision for the west that sought
to guard against the supposed lawlessness of white emigrants by placing
them under firm national control.44
B. Explaining the Constitution of Constraint
Why did Federalists embrace the constitution of constraint? Federalists
explained their actions as a vindication of order and a well-regulated
society—what we would likely now call the rule of law. For their opponents
and critics, their efforts reflected an attempt to reverse the egalitarian and
leveling principles of the American Revolution and reestablish aristocracy in
place of republicanism. Both the justifications and the critique reflected
ideology and class: a perceived commitment to the “worthy against the
licentious.”45
But there were other explanations, too. Many Federalists, including
George Washington and Henry Knox, demonstrated deep concern over what
they called “national character,” reflecting their sense that the new United
States was under close international scrutiny.46 Knox repeatedly voiced a
commitment to “justice” for the new nation’s relationship with Native
peoples, a view heavily shaped by Enlightenment humanitarianism.47 “As
we are now powerful and more enlightened than [Native peoples] are,” he
told Washington, “there is a responsibility of national character, that we
should treat them with kindness and even liberality.”48
Yet even more, Federalists acted from the realities of early American
governance and their sense of the national interest. From the beginning,
claims and demands besieged the new national government, often with those
on both sides of political conflicts appealing for federal support and aid.
Sometimes, as Madison had envisioned, these battles were economic
struggles among U.S. citizens: creditors pit against debtors, land speculators
fighting smallholders, eastern merchant elites dependent on Atlantic
commerce contesting with farmers as well as westerners reliant on the

42. Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MONROE 298, 298 (Daniel Preston & Marlena C. DeLong eds., 2006). See generally
Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 1.
43. Vitruvius, Cincinnati, September 27., CENTINEL N.W. TERRITORY, Sept. 27, 1794.
44. See supra note 29.
45. WOOD, supra note 18, at 475.
46. See, e.g., Report of Henry Knox to President George Washington (Dec. 29, 1794),
microformed on Senate Territorial Papers, Reel 2: Territory Sw. of the Ohio River (U.S. Nat’l
Archives).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Mississippi River drainage.49 Here, Federalists often favored the wealthy
and well connected, fueling popular anger and resentment against them.50
But other times, these contests pit what states and most citizens wanted
against the interests and demands of those outside the political community of
the United States. European nations sought to protect their nationals’
property against states’ expropriative schemes.51 Native leaders wanted
something similar, as states purported to legislate away Native property
altogether, opening up enormous tracts of land for white settlement.52 Here,
too, Federalists, facing a difficult choice about whose interests to favor, often
aligned federal power with the outsiders over the United States’ own citizens.
This decision partly reflected Federalist predilections: they sought to
protect property generally, and they often felt more kinship with foreign
political and diplomatic elites—even Native ones—than their own nation’s
boisterous citizens.53 But it also stemmed from Federalists’ realistic
assessment of the balance of power. European creditors and investors held
enormous power over the fledgling country and its battered finances;
Federalists recognized that the success of the United States would depend on
establishing the nation’s creditworthiness in their eyes.54 Native nations
possessed considerable power, too. Throughout much of the 1780s and
1790s, their diplomatic and military resistance sank federal plans for western
expansion, destroyed any prospect for land sales, and threatened to engulf the
United States in enormously expensive conflicts.55 “[A] protracted Indian
war,” Knox acknowledged in the midst of the fight over ratification, “would
be destruction to the republic, under its present circumstance.”56 As we shall
see, that was very nearly also true of the strengthened federal government
postratification, too.57 Moreover, Native nations on both the northern and
southern borderlands of the United States retained close alliances with
Britain and Spain. At multiple points in the early 1790s, these ties threatened
to engulf the United States in renewed war not only with Native peoples but
either or both European empires, which would have proved catastrophic.58
Little wonder, then, that the entire Washington administration concluded
that angering its own citizens was preferable to risking relations with
European or Native sovereigns. “[T]he U.S. find an Indian war too serious a
49.
50.
51.
52.

See WOOD, supra note 2, at 97–172.
Id.
See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 961–70.
See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER 150–89 (2005).
53. See, e.g., NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 13, 99–125.
54. MAX M. EDLING, A HERCULES IN THE CRADLE: WAR, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE, 1783–1867, at 17–49 (2014); Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 939–40.
55. See generally James H. Merrell, Declarations of Independence: Indian-White
Relations in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197
(Jack P. Greene ed., 1987).
56. Letter from the Secretary at War to Arthur St. Clair (Dec. 8, 1788), in 2 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 166.
57. See infra Part II.C.
58. See Ablavsky, Species of Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 603–05.
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thing, to risk incurring one merely to gratify a few [white] intruders with
settlements which are to cost the other inhabitants of the U.S. a thousand
times their value in taxes for carrying on the war they produce,” one cabinet
member wrote.59 “I am satisfied it will ever be preferred to send armed force
and make war against the intruders as being more just & less expensive.”60
These sentiments could have been penned by Knox or Hamilton, but in this
instance the robust defender of federal military intervention against U.S.
citizens was Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson. As Jefferson’s remarks
underscore, the “Federalist” constitution of constraint was as much a
recognition of the realities of governance as an endorsement of ideological
preferences that Jefferson decidedly did not share.
C. Enacting the Constitution of Constraint: The Southwest Territory
Once in power, Federalists sought to enforce the constitution of constraint
in multiple ways in multiple venues. In the realm of foreign relations, the
Washington administration proclaimed U.S. neutrality in the wars of the
French Revolution and prosecuted citizens who violated these strictures.61 It
also negotiated the Pinckney and Jay Treaties, which secured peace and
stability with Spain and Britain by sacrificing the interests of U.S. citizens,
or so an extremely heated opposition concluded.62 Domestically, the
Washington administration sought to enforce federal taxes against the
populist Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania, marshaling 13,000
federalized militia against the tax resisters—an enormous force by the
standards of the day, several times larger than the entire U.S. Army.63
Several participants were arrested and convicted of treason.64 The Adams
administration similarly used federal military might to crush the subsequent
Fries’s Rebellion north of Philadelphia, charging the tax resisters with
sedition and treason.65
But I want to focus on the Southwest Territory, one of my topics of
research. This region, today the state of Tennessee, lay on the northern edge
of the Native South, home to the powerful Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and
Chickasaw confederacies, which retained close ties with the Spanish in
Florida and Louisiana.66 North Carolina claimed ostensible jurisdiction until
59. Letter from the Secretary of State to Judge Campbell (Mar. 27, 1792), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 130, 131.
60. Id.
61. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 22, at 1019–39.
62. See generally JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS (1970).
63. See generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE
TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986); Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883 (2006).
64. SLAUGHTER, supra note 63, at 219.
65. See generally PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES’S REBELLION: THE ENDURING
STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2004).
66. On the Native South, see generally GREGORY D. SMITHERS, NATIVE SOUTHERNERS:
INDIGENOUS HISTORY FROM ORIGINS TO REMOVAL (2019); THE NATIVE SOUTH: NEW
HISTORIES AND ENDURING LEGACIES (Tim Alan Garrison & Greg O’Brien eds., 2017).
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1790, when it ceded its rights to the federal government—but not before
selling or giving away title to 20 percent of the entire territory to state
citizens, even though federal law recognized and guaranteed Native title to
nearly all this land.67 The Creek and Cherokee Nations responded to these
reckless claims of ownership, as well as the aggressive policies of
neighboring Georgia, with near-constant raids against encroaching white
settlements.68
The Washington administration sought to resolve these tensions through
authoritative treaties. In 1790, the United States ratified the Treaty of New
York with the Creek Nation, the first treaty under the new Constitution.69
The following year, it signed the Treaty of Holston with the Cherokee.70 The
administration believed that these treaties, if vigorously enforced, would
bring peace to the region.71
These actions reflected Federalist faith in treaty making, but they also
demonstrated the southeastern nations’ considerable power, especially while
allied with the neighboring Spanish. But the region’s Native leaders shared
the Federalist view that federal power and the constitution of constraint
offered an alternative to violence. For years, influential Creek leader
Alexander McGillivray had battled against what he called the “greedy
encroachments of the Georgians.”72 En route to meet with the Washington
administration in New York, McGillivray “spoke freely of the
contemptableness of the State of Georgia and in exalted terms of the federal
Government, [and] expressed a great desire to form a lasting treaty.”73 The
Georgians were outraged by the resulting treaty, but the Federalists ratified
it over their objections.74
The neighboring Cherokee Nation felt similarly to the Creek, having faced
years of encroachments by North Carolinians that Cherokee leaders hoped
the federal government would halt. They, too, made treaty concessions “for
the sake of peace and quietness,” as Cherokee leader Nenetooyah told Henry
Knox, with the expectation that the federal government would vigorously
police the resulting boundaries.75 “[I]f your People will not obey you, I wish
you to write to the President to send regular troops forward to Keep order,”
Nenetooyah later told the governor of the Southwest Territory, “for I want

67. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 19–50.
68. Id. at 139–68.
69. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Creek Nation-U.S., Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35.
70. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Cherokee Nation-U.S., July 2, 1791, 7 Stat. 39.
71. See, e.g., Letter from Judge Campbell to the Secretary of State (Feb. 25, 1792), in 4
THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 121, 121–28.
72. Letter from James White to Henry Knox (May 24, 1787), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 20, 21.
73. Letter from William Blount to John Steele (July 10, 1790), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
STEELE 67, 69 (H. M. Wagstaff ed., 1924).
74. David A. Nichols, Land, Republicanism, and Indians: Power and Policy in Early
National Georgia, 1780–1825, 85 GA. HIST. Q. 199, 215–16 (2001).
75. Conference of the Chiefs of the Cherokee Nation with the Secretary of War (Jan. 11,
1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 203, 205.
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Peace, that we may travel our paths in Peace and sleep in our Houses and rise
in peace on both sides.”76
That a Native leader would appeal for federal soldiers is at odds with our
image of the dynamics of U.S. colonialism. But Nenotooyah’s statement
reflected how Native peoples and Federalists alike found common ground in
the constitution of constraint: both sides thought peace possible but only if
their bargains were rigorously enforced.77
Yet in practice, both Native and federal leaders struggled to constrain their
citizens’ actions. “I was convinced it was not the wish of [federal officials]
or my self to go to War,” Cherokee leader Kunokeski (also known as John
Watts) observed, “but was afraid that the Lawless Men living on our lands &
the frontiers, Would be the occation of all Mischiefs.”78 Because authority
stemmed more from persuasion than coercion, Cherokee and Creek leaders
could do little to completely halt raiding parties from the decentralized, loose
confederacies that constituted the Cherokee and Creek Nations. Such attacks
quickly disillusioned territorial citizens about the constitution of constraint.
“Experience teach[es] us that Treaties answer no other Purpose,” wrote a
young Southwest Territory resident, “than opening an Easy door for the
Indians to pass [through to] Butcher our Citizens.”79 Ironically, this
observer—future president Andrew Jackson—was then serving as the
region’s U.S. attorney, responsible for indicting any citizens who violated the
treaties.
Jackson and nearly all the citizens of the Southwest Territory vociferously
demanded a federally supported invasion of the Cherokee and Creek nations,
which, they insisted, was the only way to end violence. Until the nations
were “made to feel the horrors of war, they will not know the value of peace,
nor observe the treaties,” the territorial legislature lectured Congress.80 But
the Washington administration stubbornly resisted.
“[I]t is very
questionable, while we are unable, in many cases, to execute our own laws,”
Knox lectured Georgia’s governor, “whether we ought, in justice, to levy a
general war upon the Creeks, for the criminality of an individual.”81 After
76. Correspondence of Gen. James Roberston: Conference at Tellico Blockhouse, 4 AM.
HIST. MAG. 82, 85 (1899) (reporting events of December 31, 1794).
77. See NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 9 (“Woodland Indian chiefs and captains shared many
interests with the officers and supporters of the American national government. . . . Both
believed that expansionist state governments were a threat to peace on the frontier, and both
wanted the new American federal government to manage Indian-white relations.”).
78. Letter from John Watts to John Sevier (Mar. 4, 1797) (on file with the Tennessee State
Library and Archive, Governor John Sevier Papers, 1796–1801, Box 2, Folder 2).
79. Letter from Andrew Jackson to John McKee (May 16, 1794), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
ANDREW JACKSON 48, 48–49 (Sam B. Smith & Harriet Chappell Owsley eds., 1980).
80. Letter from Governor Blount to the Secretary of War (Sept. 21, 1794), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 354, 354–55, 354 n.21 (quoting The Memorial of the
Legislative Council and House of Representatives, to the Congress of the United States of
America (Sept. 18, 1794), in JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF
THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SOUTH OF THE RIVER OHIO 22, 22–23
(Nashville, McKinnie & Brown, True Whig Off. 1852)).
81. Letter from the Secretary of War to the Governor of Georgia (July 11, 1792), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 256, 256.
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extensive discussion, the entire cabinet concluded that Congress alone had
the constitutional power to authorize any attacks.82 But a Federalistdominated Congress refused to sanction such violence, despite the over-thetop rhetoric of Southern representatives.83
For citizens of the Southwest Territory, this refusal was proof that the
eastern elites that dominated Congress cared nothing about their lives but, on
the contrary, favored Native peoples: Congress, one resident complained,
“are more favourable to their savage, adopted, and illegitimate, than to us
their legitimate children.”84 On the floor of Congress, a Georgian
representative proclaimed that federal officials betrayed “improper leanings
in favor of the Indians” that made his “heart boil.”85 And so white residents
decided to take matters into their own hands. The Washington administration
had authorized territorial officials to call up the militia, unambiguously
limiting it to defensive purposes only.86 Now, the militia flagrantly defied
these orders. In the summer of 1793, they attacked the town of the Cherokee
leader Scolocutta, who at that very moment, was meeting with federal
representatives.87 Undeterred, the militia killed eight or nine Cherokee as
well as one of the white officials.88 The next summer, an even larger militia
expedition destroyed the Cherokee town of Nickajack in a genocidal assault
that indiscriminately slaughtered fifty Cherokee men, women, and children
as they fled to the Tennessee River.89
These actions understandably disillusioned Cherokees in the constitution
of constraint. “Surely you are no head-man nor warrior,” Scolocutta wrote
to one federal official.90 “I think you are afraid of these bad men . . . . I think
they are making fun of you, and won’t listen to your talks.”91 Scolocutta was
right. The campaigns outraged the Washington administration: the president
denounced such “violent and lawless inroads,” while Henry Knox lectured
officials that, “[u]nless such crimes shall be punished in an exemplary
manner, it will be in vain for the government to make further attempts to
establish any plan or system for the administration of Indian Affairs founded
on the principles of moderation and justice.”92 Territorial officials tried to
subject the expeditions’ leaders to the “force of law” but they failed: the
expeditions had been widely popular among territorial citizens and so no

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 150–51.
Id. at 159–61.
Tho. Donnel, Mr. Roulstone, KNOXVILLE GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1793.
4 ANNALS OF CONG. 778 (1794).
ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 139–67.
Id. at 151–52.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Letter from Hanging Maw to Secretary Smith (June 15, 1793), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 460, 460.
91. Id.
92. Letter from Secretary of War to Governor Blount (Aug. 26, 1793), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 299, 299.
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grand jury would indict the perpetrators.93 Territorial citizens took the pages
of the Territory’s sole newspaper to insist that the expeditions were
constitutional.94 They pointed particularly to the provision of Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution barring state warmaking unless “actually
invaded,”95 which they liberally interpreted to mean that “when an enemy
invades any particular state, such state may engage in war, and Congress is
bound to support her”—sidestepping the potential objection that the Territory
was not a state.96
Federal efforts to restrain the citizens of the Southwest Territory, then,
seemingly yielded little other than disillusioning Native leaders and white
citizens alike in the promise of federal power. When in 1796, the Territory
joined the Union as the new state of Tennessee, it was, as everyone
anticipated, staunchly Republican.97 Moreover, as a state, Tennessee was
even better positioned to thwart Federalist efforts to enforce the constitution
of constraint within its borders.
This dynamic was especially clear in the most important and contentious
issue in the new state’s politics. In 1797, the federal government at last
officially surveyed the boundary of the 1791 Treaty of Holston.98 The new
boundary clarified that an estimated 2500–3000 white Tennesseans claiming
ownership under North Carolina’s questionable land grants were living on
Cherokee land—a crime under the federal 1793 Intercourse Act.99 The
Federalist Adams administration, committed to placating Cherokee demands
and enforcing the Treaty of Holston, dispatched federal soldiers to evict these
intruders.100
White residents were outraged. Some intruders violently resisted, killing
several army horses and wounding a federal soldier.101 But the most
sustained and effective opposition came from state politicians, especially the
state’s congressional delegation, which included Andrew Jackson, now
Tennessee’s sole congressman. The delegation constantly agitated the
administration on the subject, bombarding it with letters and petitions.102
The administration had to decide: would it favor the Cherokees or the state
of Tennessee? Ultimately, the choice proved easy: the Cherokees might be
upset, but they would likely not risk war over the issue. Meanwhile,
Tennessee’s representatives effectively convulsed the federal government.

93. Letter from Acting Governor Smith to Secretary of War (June 22, 1793), in 4 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 276, 277.
94. See, e.g., William Cooke, For the Gazette, KNOXVILLE GAZETTE, Dec. 29, 1792.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
96. Cooke, supra note 94.
97. JOHN R. FINGER, TENNESSEE FRONTIERS: THREE REGIONS IN TRANSITION 118 (2001)
(ebook).
98. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 201–30.
99. Ch. 19, § 5, 1 Stat. 329, 330; see also ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 215–18.
100. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 215–21.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew Jackson to John Adams (Mar. 5, 1798), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF ANDREW JACKSON, supra note 79, at 185, 185–86.
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The administration capitulated, and the Senate authorized a new treaty to
extinguish Cherokee title to the disputed lands at federal expense.103
For their part, the Cherokee strongly resisted any sale, but they finally
grudgingly agreed once President Adams made clear that the federal
government would not continue to defend Cherokee title: “worthy and wellintentioned settlers” had appealed to Congress, Adams wrote Cherokee
leaders, and “the representation of their sufferings induced the Senate of the
United States to advise a new purchase of land.”104 Cherokee leaders,
including Nenetooyah, drove a hard bargain and secured a much larger
compensation than in previous treaties.105 Still, they doubtless wondered
why only the complaints of the “deserving settlers” carried weight; they, after
all, had suffered even more heavily at whites’ hands, as they constantly
reminded federal officials.106 But, as Adams’s letter not so subtly reminded
them, the Cherokee, unlike whites, were not citizens, nor did they enjoy
“representation” in Congress.107 In the contest for whose interests the
administration would favor, the Cherokee would always face a structural
disadvantage.
D. Explaining the Failure of the Constitution of Constraint
The Federalists were not naïve. The Constitution’s drafters and
proponents had recognized that pursuing the national interest—including, at
times, favoring outsiders over U.S. citizens—would be unpopular and
politically costly. As Madison’s “Vices” indicated, they had created the
Constitution partly to remedy such difficulties, creating a government further
removed from populist demands in an attempt to allow disinterested
statesmen to pursue the national interest.108
Although it has become commonplace to argue that the unexpected rise of
partisanship doomed such expectations of filtration,109 the Federalist vision
always misread early American politics. The Federalists did not anticipate
how policies they considered in the national interest—like, say, the Sedition
Act110—would appear to fellow citizens and later observers alike as
pretextual efforts to use federal authority to preserve power. But, as Cornell
and Leonard’s recent book demonstrates, the Federalists also failed to foresee
how long-standing practices of politics out-of-doors would continue to shape
federal power.111 Like its predecessor, the Federalists’ renewed imperial
103. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 201–30.
104. Talk from the President of the United States to His Beloved Chiefs, Warriors, and
Children, of the Cherokee Nation (Aug. 27, 1798), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 640, 641.
105. Treaty Between the United States of America, and the Cherokee Indians, Cherokee
Nation-U.S., Oct. 2, 1798, 7 Stat. 62.
106. Talk from the President of the United States to His Beloved Chiefs, Warriors, and
Children, of the Cherokee Nation, supra note 104, at 640–41.
107. Id.
108. Madison, supra note 14, at 351–52.
109. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 2, at 209–38.
110. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
111. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 44–81.
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state confronted mass mobilization and popular protest. Remonstrances,
petitioning, and raucous newspaper and pamphlet wars persisted; so, too, did
the deeply engrained structures of local governance that federal officials
futilely attempted to circumvent or diminish, even in places like the
territories under federal jurisdiction.
At times, federal authority might prevail against such obstacles, as the
Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated, but only through raw military force.112
And perhaps not even then, as events in Tennessee suggested. In using the
army to enforce the Treaty of Holston, the Adams administration had acted
just as the advocates of the constitution of constraint intended: it sought to
use enhanced federal powers to pursue what it believed to be the national
interest, even if that required favoring the outsiders’ interests over U.S.
citizens’ interests.113 A parochial state elite strongly opposed such measures,
as Madison feared. But a national majority did not overcome its objections,
as he anticipated. Instead, the rest of the nation proved less disinterested than
uninterested in what happened in Tennessee, leaving it to those most
affected—white Tennesseans and Cherokees—to battle for federal support.
This was always an uneven contest: white Tennesseans’ vocal and agitated
representatives were part of the federal government, giving clout that the
Cherokees could not match. And so even the sympathetic Adams
administration decided not to expend the political will to overcome such
determined opposition.
Yet, for all the ways that the Federalists appeared out of touch with the
politics of the nation that they helped create, their constitutionalism was not
simply a relic of an older, more hierarchical world that newly minted U.S.
citizens increasingly repudiated. Rather, the Federalists were arguably the
victims of their own success. As the next part explores, their constitution of
constraint failed in large part because the constitution of empowerment so
readily eclipsed it.
II. THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPOWERMENT
A. Constitutional Design
The other Federalist project, what I have dubbed the constitution of
empowerment, is also well known in the historiography. Max Edling in
particular has drawn attention to how eagerly the Federalists sought to
construct a fiscal-military state similar to the behemoths constructed in
eighteenth-century Britain and France.114 Although this aim was a particular
hobbyhorse of Alexander Hamilton, Edling stresses that it was a goal widely
shared among other Federalists.115
112. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
114. See generally EDLING, supra note 54; MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF
GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE
(2003).
115. EDLING, supra note 114, at 8–9.
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Experience under the Articles had underscored the need for expanded
resources. The United States had fought the American Revolution with ad
hoc institutions and a flurry of debt, but its unexpected victory gave the new
nation’s leaders remarkable confidence bordering on arrogance: “[t]he
Citizens of America,” George Washington wrote at war’s end, were now “the
sole Lords and Proprietors of a vast tract of Continent.”116 Reality soon
dashed such grandiose expectations. This new continental power’s army
consisted of a miniscule force of a few hundred ill-equipped men, spread
across isolated outposts along the Ohio River, which Congress could barely
feed.117 Secretary at War Henry Knox routinely penned reports to Congress
bewailing the lack of resources to project any federal power.118
The drafters of the new constitution sought to remedy what one
congressional committee had called the “imbecility of the federal
government.”119 The document created a robust financial system of taxation
and authorized the creation of a national military, while granting the federal
government the sole power to declare war.120 Importantly, it also empowered
the federal government to federalize the most substantial military force in the
early United States, the state militias.121
The creation of a fiscal-military state was a quintessentially Federalist
project in both senses of the term. As Edling traces, the Constitution’s
proponents constantly invoked the need for expanded fiscal-military powers
to justify the new government.122 At the same time, the document’s
opponents constantly railed against the prospect of a standing army and
national debt, which smacked too much of the European statecraft they
thought the Revolution had supposedly been fought to reject.123 After
ratification, this divide quickly reappeared, separating members of the
Washington administration more bullish on the fiscal-military state,
especially Hamilton and Knox, from its critics, particularly Jefferson, around
whom the nascent Republican opposition coalesced.
B. Explaining the Constitution of Empowerment
Why did the Federalists embrace the constitution of empowerment? In
part, for many Federalists drawing from European models, the fiscal-military
state represented what governments did: they built the institutional means to
project power. For Hamilton and others, a strengthened financial system was
also an important aspect of nation building. The national debt would tie local
116. GEORGE WASHINGTON, THE LAST OFFICIAL ADDRESS, OF HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL
WASHINGTON 4 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1783).
117. See generally RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783–1802 (1975).
118. Id.
119. REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783–1812, at 34
(1967).
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cls. 1, 11–13.
121. Id. cls. 14–15.
122. EDLING, supra note 114, at 8–9.
123. Id. at 61–68.
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financial and economic elites to the new national government, recreating the
chains of patronage that glued European empires together, while federal
finance would promote internal and foreign commerce.124
As for the strengthened military, as we have seen, it was closely tied to the
constitution of constraint—a way to discipline an often recalcitrant
citizenry.125 Strikingly, many of the Federalists were Continental Army
veterans, and so embraced a militaristic vision of how law and order worked.
This was especially true of Henry Knox, who saw a national military as the
sole foundation for peace on the borderlands. “The angry passions of the
frontier Indians and whites,” he wrote, “are too violent to be controuled by
the feeble authority of the civil power.”126 He continued, “In such a case the
sword of the Republic only, is adequate to guard a due administration of
Justice, and the preservation of the peace.”127
Yet the Federalists also embraced the constitution of empowerment as a
way to sell a controversial new government. During the hard-fought political
campaign for ratification, Federalists rarely talked about marching federal
soldiers against the nation’s own citizens. Instead, they constantly and
frequently invoked external threats: the British in Canada, the Spanish in
Florida and Louisiana, and what Hamilton called, in Federalist No. 24, the
“savage tribes on our Western frontier.”128 Indeed, the constant parade of
hostile Europeans and vengeful Native peoples, and the insistence that only
the federal government could prevent the challenge, became something of a
Federalist trope during ratification.129
Much of this rhetoric was expedient. Unlike Washington, Jefferson, or
Knox, Hamilton gave little thought or consideration to Native peoples, and,
to the extent he did, he shared the Washington administration’s embrace of
treaties and federal law as the basis for peace.130 But Hamilton and other
Federalists recognized that the Indian threat had been routinely and
effectively deployed to justify governmental authority for over a half century.
Such ritualized invocation of white suffering at Native hands—what
historian Peter Silver has called the “anti-Indian sublime”—had proved

124. Max M. Edling, “So Immense a Power in the Affairs of War”: Alexander Hamilton
and the Restoration of Public Credit, 64 WM. & MARY Q. 287, 291–93 (2007).
125. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
126. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 33, at 136.
127. Id.
128. THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 25, at 133 (Alexander Hamilton).
129. See EDLING, supra note 114, at 122 (“The idea that the national government would be
able to develop the West by pacifying the Indian tribes in the Ohio country through war or
treaty was a very common theme in Federalist rhetoric. So, too, was the claim that Britain
and Spain had interests in the American interior and that they supported and stirred up the
Indian nations against American settlers.”).
130. See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Mathews (Sept. 25, 1794), in 17
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 270, 273 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1972) (critiquing
Georgia’s Indian policy and arguing that “unless means to restrain, by punishing the violences
which those inhabitants are in the habit of perpetrating against the Indians, can be put in
execution, all endeavours to preserve peace with them must be for ever frustrated”).
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especially important for national unity during the Revolution.131 And so
many Federalists readily adopted this rhetorical tact—a position at odds with
their preferred policies—to sell their new Constitution’s most controversial
features.132 But they would discover, after ratification, that these political
concessions had consequences, as many newly minted U.S. citizens took the
Federalists at their word on the new government’s function.
C. Constitution of Empowerment in Action: The Northwest Territory
As Daniel Hulsebosch has underscored, the new federal government that
the Washington administration built proved less a fiscal-military state than a
“fiscal-commercial” one.133 Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton
soon constructed a system of national finance and a funded national debt to
expand the federal government’s fiscal resources.134 By contrast, although
Secretary of War Henry Knox sought to create a professional and disciplined
national military, his efforts to expand national oversight over the militia and
to bolster the nascent professional army were halting and controversial.135
Yet the fledgling federal government’s first substantial challenge
nonetheless tested its fiscal-military capacity. “The Indian war,” as AngloAmericans of the time simply called it (scholars have subsequently labeled it
the Northwest Indian War) was fought almost entirely within the newly
created Northwest Territory.136 This purported federal jurisdiction was a
homeland for the Wyandots, Miamis, Delawares, Shawnees, Anishinaabeg,
and other nations who confederated to combat U.S. encroachments.137 With
British support, this Native confederacy insisted on the Ohio River as the
boundary between Native and U.S. territory; the federal government, which
claimed to have already purchased much Native land beyond this line,
resisted.138 Ultimately, federal military might prevailed. At the ensuing
Treaty of Greenville, federal negotiators forced the defeated Native nations
to cede the United States most of present-day Ohio.139
This capsule summary is as much attention as the conflict receives in most
histories of the 1790s—largely because the conflict and its outcome feel so
familiar. In hindsight, the Northwest Indian War appears part of an unbroken
history of violence against Native peoples that stretched backward to contact
131. PETER SILVER, OUR SAVAGE NEIGHBORS: HOW INDIAN WAR TRANSFORMED EARLY
AMERICA 83–90 (2008).
132. Ablavsky, Savage Constitution, supra note 1, at 1058–71.
133. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constitution-Making in the Shadow of Empire, 56 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 84, 84–91 (2016).
134. See generally Edling, supra note 124.
135. KOHN, supra note 117, at 128–39.
136. On the Northwest Indian War, see generally COLIN CALLOWAY, THE VICTORY WITH
NO NAME: THE NATIVE AMERICAN DEFEAT OF THE FIRST AMERICAN ARMY (2014); WILLIAM
H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO MASSACRE: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF THE UNITED
STATES ARMY, 1784–1791 (1974); KOHN, supra note 117.
137. See generally ERIC HINDERAKER, ELUSIVE EMPIRES: CONSTRUCTING COLONIALISM IN
THE OHIO VALLEY, 1673–1800 (1997).
138. See CALLOWAY, supra note 136, at 146–48.
139. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49.
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and lasted for most of the nineteenth century. These conflicts unfolded
similarly: Anglo-Americans arrogated sovereignty and ownership over
North America to themselves and, ultimately—through overwhelming force
and raw, sometimes genocidal, violence—the federal government crushed
Native peoples’ armed resistance to these claims.140 As with subsequent
conflicts, it was not clear that Anglo-Americans considered the Northwest
Indian War a “war” in a legal or constitutional sense; Congress never
declared war but merely authorized the president to federalize the state
militia.141
But reading the Northwest Indian War as simply the first instance when
the U.S. Army violently suppressed Native resistance against U.S.
imperialism ignores how seriously the conflict challenged the nascent federal
government. Unlike later Indian wars, the United States nearly lost, with two
federal expeditions suffering catastrophic defeats. The second expedition, in
fall 1791, lost two-thirds of its men at the hands of the Northwest
Confederacy; this unnamed battle remains the worst defeat that the United
States ever suffered at Native hands.142 The new U.S. Army seemed
incapable of maintaining discipline or supplying its own troops, even as the
conflict led British officials to talk openly about an imminent renewed war
with the United States.143 Ultimately, the federal government prevailed—
but only after it spent four years, and over half of the new nation’s budget, to
equip and dispatch a far better trained and equipped fighting force that eked
out an ambiguous victory at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.144 Even then,
historians have argued that U.S. success was owed more to diplomatic than
military victories, as the United States persuaded the British to abandon their
Native allies, forcing Native nations to the bargaining table.145
The Northwest Indian War, then, was the most significant early test of the
Federalist state and one that the new nation nearly failed. It was also,
relatedly, markedly controversial among Anglo-Americans.146 But the war’s
politics did not map neatly onto the nascent Republican-Federalist divide,
instead revealing a more complicated history of who in the early United
States embraced the fiscal-military state and why.
Partisanship certainly shaped many responses to the war. Many
Jeffersonians, for instance, thought the war an unnecessary and pretextual
effort to justify an expanded military. Jefferson himself weakly supported
the conflict but thought that more assiduous efforts at peace would have been
salutary. “Every rag of an Indian depredation will otherwise serve as a
ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public debt
140. See generally FRED ANDERSON & ANDREW R. L. CAYTON, THE DOMINION OF WAR:
EMPIRE AND LIBERTY IN NORTH AMERICA, 1500–2000 (2005).
141. See generally Adam Mendel, Note, The First AUMF: The Northwest Indian War,
1790–1795, and the War on Terror, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1309 (2016).
142. CALLOWAY, supra note 136, at 6.
143. Id. at 5.
144. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 139–68.
145. CALLOWAY, supra note 136.
146. See infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
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necessary for the happiness of the U.S.,” he observed, “and we shall never be
permitted to get rid of either.”147 Others were similarly skeptical of Knox’s
motives. “I have a great respect for the War officer,” one proto-Republican
senator wrote Washington, “but he appears to me to be anxiously desirous of
having a considerable standing military force, all his views in my estimation
tend to that end.”148
Yet Knox was no warmonger. In his lengthy reports to Washington, the
secretary of war had repeatedly advocated peace with Native nations: “[t]he
United States can get nothing by an Indian war,” he wrote, “but they risque
men, money and reputation.”149 Yet for Knox, peace would come only by
robustly applying the constitution of constraint against “lawless” whites and
Native peoples alike. The Northwest Indian War began when Knox
authorized a targeted expedition to “extirpate, utterly . . . banditti” Indians,
one that would function similarly to the later expeditions against the Whiskey
rebels.150 “[T]he vengeance of the Union is to be pointed only against the
perpetrators of the mischief,” Knox stressed, “and not against the friendly
nor even neutral tribes.”151
Confident in the purity of his intentions, Knox badly miscalculated. Since
the birth of the United States, Native peoples in the Ohio country had
suspected that the new nation intended to exterminate them and take their
lands.152 They were not wrong. Many Anglo-Americans sought to do just
that, as events like the 1782 Gnadenhutten Massacre—in which the
Pennsylvania militia cold-bloodedly killed nearly one hundred pacifist
Delawares—demonstrated.153 The federal invasion seemingly confirmed
Native peoples’ fears that the United States’ talk of peace was mere trickery;
here, it seemed, was proof of the nation’s true intent. As a result, Knox’s
targeted expedition quickly brought about the full-blown war that the
secretary sought so desperately to avoid.
Once the initial expedition ended in disaster for the U.S. Army, however,
the need to prove federal power became its own justification. Believing that
establishing the new nation’s overwhelming force was the only way to secure
lasting peace, Knox immediately began planning another, larger assault.
“The great object of the campaign will be, to convince the indians of the
147. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Apr. 17, 1791), in 20 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 234, 236 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
148. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to George Washington (Feb. 10, 1792), in 9 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 554, 556.
149. Report of Henry Knox to President Washington, supra note 46.
150. Letter from Henry Knox to Josiah Harmar (June 7, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS: INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 97, 97.
151. Letter from Henry Knox to Arthur St. Clair (June 7, 1790), in 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS:
THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ARTHUR ST. CLAIR 147, 148 (William Henry Smith ed.,
Cincinnati, Robert Clarke Co. 1882).
152. Jeffrey Ostler, “To Extirpate the Indians”: An Indigenous Consciousness of Genocide
in the Ohio Valley and Lower Great Lakes, 1750s–1810, 72 WM. & MARY Q. 587, 587–622
(2015).
153. SILVER, supra note 131, at 267–76; Rob Harper, Looking the Other Way: The
Gnadenhutten Massacre and the Contextual Interpretation of Violence, 64 WM. & MARY Q.
621, 621–44 (2007).
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futility of resistance,” he told President Washington, “and of the absolute
necessity of submitting to the justice and mercy of the United States.”154
When that campaign failed even more spectacularly, Knox became even
more resolute, advocating increasing the army to over 5000 regular
soldiers—a number Congress found wildly inflated.155
The Northwest Indian War was deeply uncomfortable for Knox and other
Federalists, as they defended a conflict flatly at odds with their professed
aims. Many of their constituents recognized, and resented, this contradiction.
“I was a little surprized to find that the Indian War is extremely unpopular in
New England,” Washington’s personal secretary reported from the nation’s
most Federalist region.156 “I have not heard it mentioned by a single person
who did not consider it as arising rather from a wish on the part of the United
States to obtain lands to which they have no just claim”—the exact opposite
principle from what Knox sought to establish as the foundation for the
nation’s policy toward Native nations.157
Pressured, Knox and Washington publicly issued a statement to justify the
conflict.158 This was a revealing document. In it, they described the federal
government’s assiduous efforts to maintain peace, but they also offered a
parade of the perfidious acts of Native peoples, recounting the “barbarous
warfare practised by the Indians”159 and ritually invoking “the tomahawk and
scalping-knife.”160 And they vindicated the war by appealing to the federal
government’s purpose. “To obtain protection against lawless violence, was
a main object for which the present government was instituted. It is, indeed,
a main object of all government,” they recited.161 “[T]he obligation of the
government of the United States, to afford the requisite protection, cannot be
less sacred in reference to the inhabitants of their Western, than to those of
their Atlantic Frontier.”162
What is striking about this statement is how sharply it conflicted with the
personal views of both Knox and Washington, who both privately bemoaned
invocations of the anti-Indian sublime.163 Moreover, the document’s vision
of the federal role cast aside the constitution of constraint that the two men
154. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington (Feb. 22, 1791), in 7 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 402, 403.
155. CALLOWAY, supra note 136, at 142.
156. Letter from Tobias Lear to George Washington (July 21, 1792), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 556, 558.
157. Id.
158. Henry Knox, The Causes of the Existing Hostilities Between the United States, and
Certain Tribes of Indians North-West of the Ohio (Jan. 26, 1792), reprinted in 2 THE
TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 359.
159. Id. at 360.
160. Id. at 364.
161. Id. at 365–66.
162. Id. at 366.
163. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Edmund Pendleton (Jan. 22, 1795), in 17
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES, supra note 32, at 424, 425
(“[I]gnorant Savages . . . poor wretches, have no Press thro’ which their grievances are related;
and it is well known, that when one side only of a Story is heard, and often repeated, the human
mind becomes impressed with it, insensibly . . . .”); supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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had long advocated for in favor of what we might call frontier
constitutionalism—the constitutional views espoused by the white residents
of Kentucky, the Northwest Territory, western Pennsylvania, and the new
nation’s other borderlands.
Like the citizens of the Southwest Territory, white inhabitants of the
Northwest Territory had little patience for the constitution of constraint and
readily condemned any government official who opposed their calls for
violence. “[W]hoever should attempt to preserve Peace with Indians was
instantly denounced as an Indian Friend,” Governor Blount reported from the
Southwest Territory, “and the Cry accordingly raised against him.”164 In the
Northwest Territory, residents reportedly plotted to assassinate their archFederalist governor for his pro-Native views.165 In both territories, angry
constitutional arguments filled the newspapers, with authors cribbing
revolutionary complaints to argue for local autonomy against supposedly
heavy-handed federal rule.166
Yet territorial citizens were not Jeffersonians. They, unlike Jefferson,
were eager advocates of a federal fiscal-military state—so long as it acted in
their interests.167 Knox’s assertions about western citizens’ entitlement to
federal protection could have been lifted from the territorial newspapers,
which routinely invoked this constitutional claim to demand federal aid.168
Moreover, the borderlands’ economy benefited enormously from the federal
invasion. Nearly overnight, the war turned Cincinnati into a boomtown,
while Kentucky, one observer noted, was “more full of Money arising
from . . . the army North of Ohio than any other Part of America.”169
The similarity between the administration’s pronouncement on the war’s
causes and frontier constitutionalism was not accidental, as the
administration deliberately adopted borderlands legal rhetoric to placate
restive territorial citizens. Federal military force was the method most likely
“to attach the people of the frontiers to the government of the United States,”
Knox stated in justifying the expedition into Indian country.170 Later, in
further selling the campaign, Knox noted that it was a “circumstance of no
small importance, that the desultory operations will be highly acceptable to
the Kentucky district, and other frontier counties.”171 Knox’s comments
164. Letter from William Blount to Alexander Kelley & Littlepage Sims (Dec. 1, 1795), in
4 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 34, at 408, 410.
165. WINTHROP SARGENT, POLITICAL INTOLERANCE OR THE VIOLENCE OF PARTY SPIRIT;
EXEMPLIFIED IN A RECENT REMOVAL FROM OFFICE 17–18 (Boston, Benjamin Rusell 1801).
166. See ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 132–36.
167. See PATRICK GRIFFIN, AMERICAN LEVIATHAN: EMPIRE, NATION, AND REVOLUTIONARY
FRONTIER 241 (2007) (“Westerners—even those inclined still to view Indians as redeemable—
believed that nothing less than the state securing the West by vanquishing Indians and
removing them from white settlement areas could rescue it from disorder.”).
168. ABLAVSKY, supra note 1, at 187–91.
169. WILLIAM H. MASTERSON, WILLIAM BLOUNT 254 (1954).
170. Henry Knox, Report to the President of the United States upon the Operations to be
Adopted for the Ensuing Year upon the Frontier (Mar. 19, 1791) (on file with Northwest
Territory Collection, Indiana Historical Society, Box 1, Folder 36, p. 2).
171. Letter from Henry Knox to George Washington, supra note 154, at 406.
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found echoes among other Federalists, who similarly saw the conflict as a
chance to demonstrate their commitment to frontier citizens: “Congress has
little occasion to make itself known to them except by acts of protection,”
one Massachusetts Federalist wrote.172
This evidence suggests two points. First, the Northwest Indian War
underscored how little Federalists controlled the meaning of federal power
in the early United States. The war was as much a Federalist project as their
effort to secure peace through restraining U.S. citizens was; in fact, Knox
saw them as interrelated projects. But the war’s course and implications were
largely determined by those outside the administration. Despite Knox’s
intentions, Native nations in the Ohio country reasonably interpreted the U.S.
invasion of their homelands not as a targeted attack on “renegade” Native
peoples but as proof that the administration’s rhetoric of peace masked its
true intent to fulfill whites’ long-standing aspirations to extirpate Native
peoples.173 Similarly, territorial citizens took the conflict as vindication of
their vituperative anti-Indian rhetoric. They had successfully argued that
their right of protection mandated federally supported violence against their
supposed enemies.
Yet, and second, the forces of popular constitutionalism did not simply
overpower the supposedly antipopulist Federalists. Rather, saddled with an
expensive and controversial war, the Washington administration calculatedly
adopted the principles and rhetoric of the frontier constitutionalism it
purported to despise. As this reversal demonstrated, the Federalists not only
failed to anticipate how poorly filtration would function, but they also had
not guessed how quickly they too would succumb to the power of politics to
shape constitutional meaning. Just as during ratification, Federalists’
eagerness to placate some of their citizens helped make a supposedly
impartial federal government into an instrument of brutal violence against
Native peoples.
D. Explaining the Flourishing of the Constitution of Empowerment
In 1807, shortly after much of the Northwest Territory became the state of
Ohio, Joseph Buell wrote to an unknown correspondent on “business of
trifling consequence.”174 Buell wanted to know what to do with a small
cannon provided by the federal government “in the time of the Indian war”
during “our former stage of government.”175 The gun’s “principal use” now,
he reported, was the “discharging of it on the 4th of July, Reechoing the toasts
drank in contempt to the Gen[era]l Government.”176

172. Letter from Fisher Ames to Rufus Putnam (Feb. 22, 1791), in THE MEMOIRS OF RUFUS
PUTNAM AND CERTAIN OFFICIAL PAPERS AND CORRESPONDENCE 250, 250 (Rufus Putnam ed.,
1903).
173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
174. Letter from Joseph Buell (July 2, 1807) (on file with the Marietta, Ohio, Collection,
Ohio Historical Society, Box 4).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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Viewed from the present, Buell’s letter presents a familiar contradiction:
the beneficiaries of federal largesse spurning the very government that aided
them. Certainly, if the Federalists hoped to win the appreciation and support
of the region’s inhabitants by lavishing them with federal support, they failed.
Soon after the war’s end, citizens in the Northwest Territory expressed their
“acknowledgments and gratitude” that the federal government had
“expended the whole revenue of the union for several years, in order to afford
us ample protection”—right before launching into a litany of complaints and
attacks on federal policy.177 In the end, the new state of Ohio, formed from
the former territory, became just as staunchly Republican as Tennessee, with
most residents eagerly supporting President Jefferson’s policies.178
Yet Buell’s letter exemplifies less a paradox than a long-standing fight
over the purpose of the federal government. Having created a newly
empowered national government, Federalists discovered that they could not
easily control how this strengthened state was deployed. Citizens long
resented federal efforts to constrain them but eagerly seized the fiscalmilitary state to serve their own ends. For their part, the Jeffersonians, now
elevated to power, did little to alter the militaristic approach they had earlier
condemned.179 Both during the military campaigns of William Henry
Harrison against a renewed Native confederacy under Tecumseh and then
during the wider conflict of the War of 1812, Jefferson and his copartisans
deployed federal fiscal and military resources toward U.S. expansion just as
the Federalists had done.180 And just as with the Federalists, this outcome
reflected less hypocrisy than politics: though Jefferson was still personally
ambivalent about the federal state and westward expansion, many in the
Republican coalition, especially in the West, readily pushed the constitution
of empowerment. In the end, the Republicans proved no more consistent, or
adept, at controlling the constitution’s meaning than their predecessors. And
once again, the consequence was that federal power was wielded largely in
one direction—against Native peoples who had their own views on the role
of the federal government but who were nonetheless excluded from the realm
of constitutional politics.

177. At a Meeting of a Number of the Inhabitants of the Township of Columbia at the House
of Mr. William Stanley, on Monday the 25th of January 1796, CENTINEL N.W. TERRITORY,
Feb. 20, 1796.
178. CAYTON, supra note 29, at 68–94.
179. Bethel Saler, An Empire for Liberty, a State for Empire: The U.S. National State
Before and After the Revolution of 1800, in THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE,
AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 360, 360–82 (James P. Horn et al. eds., 2002). Indeed, although
Buell’s letter provides little detail, the toasts at issue may have been Federalist attacks on the
Jeffersonian embargo.
180. See generally ADAM JORTNER, THE GODS OF PROPHETSTOWN: THE BATTLE OF
TIPPECANOE AND THE HOLY WAR FOR THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2011); ROBERT M. OWENS,
MR. JEFFERSON’S HAMMER: WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY (2007).
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CONCLUSION
The conventional story of the Federalist Constitution is one of retreat:
after a brief reign, the Federalists largely lost power as Republicans captured
the presidency and Congress. Yet their influence endured, this story runs, in
the judiciary, as judges like James Kent, Joseph Story, and especially Chief
Justice John Marshall checked states’ efforts to interfere with national
authority, enshrined the law of nations, and protected so-called “vested
rights” to property.181
Yet even as Marshall embraced the constitution of constraint, he proved
an equally robust defender of the constitution of empowerment—sometimes
at the same time. The 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck,182 for instance, is hailed
as the origin of Marshall’s Contract Clause183 jurisprudence, as the Chief
Justice held that Georgia’s legislature could not invalidate an earlier 1795
sale of millions of acres of western territory to land companies.184 Yet at the
same time, Marshall endorsed, in a sentence, Georgia’s right to sell the land
even while federal treaties guaranteed Native ownership.185 Marshall’s aside
disregarded a decade of legal contentions in which the Washington
administration and others had repeatedly insisted that Georgia had no legal
or constitutional right to sell land it did not own.186
Fletcher prefigured Johnson v. M’Intosh,187 Marshall’s 1823 decision that
defined Native title as a mere right of occupancy.188 Johnson is a strikingly
complex decision in which Marshall at once advanced standard AngloAmerican attacks on Native ownership even as he distanced himself from
them.189 Yet, under the constitution of constraint, Johnson was a pretty easy
case: both British and federal law barred individuals from purchasing Native
title.190 Rather than simply invoking positive law, though, Marshall penned
a much more expansive decision that endorsed Anglo-Americans’ rights to

181. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 10, at 85–112.
182. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
184. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87.
185. Id. at 142–43 (“The majority of the Court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian
title, which is certainly to be respected by all Courts, until it be legitimately extinguished, is
not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State.”).
186. See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on Certain Georgia Land Grants (May 3, 1790), in 16
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 147, at 406, 407 (concluding that, under the
Constitution, Georgia “could not convey, what she had not herself, that is, the means of
acquiring”). On the controversy over ownership of the Yazoo lands, compare ABRAHAM
BISHOP, GEORGIA SPECULATION UNVEILED, pt. 2 (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 1798)
(arguing that Georgia lacked ownership), with ROBERT GOODLOE HARPER, THE CASE OF THE
GEORGIA SALES ON THE MISSISSIPPI CONSIDERED (Philadelphia, Richard Folwell 1799)
(arguing that Georgia owned the Yazoo lands).
187. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
188. Id. at 574.
189. Id.; see also Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The Law of Imperialism in
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 75 G.W. L. REV. 329, 329 (2006) (describing Johnson as “one of the
stranger opinions in American jurisprudence” in which “Chief Justice Marshall is elegiac,
triumphal, and recurrently ambivalent toward his own reasoning”).
190. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 604.
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own, buy, and sell title to Native lands even before Native peoples had ceded
any rights.191
As a result, Johnson quickly became a key text in the constitution of
empowerment. Kent cited to the case in his influential Commentaries on
American Law to describe Native peoples as “separate, subordinate, and
dependent.”192 Johnson also emboldened states. In the late 1820s and 1830s,
as Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and other states began to aggressively
assert a long-standing claim that they had absolute jurisdiction over their
entire territories, they routinely invoked Marshall’s decision to vindicate
their rights. When the Cherokee Nation and its allies responded that federal
law recognized their sovereignty and invalidated the states’ actions—
invoking, in short, the constitution of constraint, just as earlier Cherokee
leaders had done—Southerners replied that Johnson was “the death blow to
this new doctrine of Indian sovereignty.”193
In the end, Marshall disagreed with this interpretation. In Worcester v.
Georgia,194 the Chief Justice endorsed a vision of federal supremacy over
Indian affairs that foreclosed Georgia’s assertion of jurisdiction, an embrace
of the constitution of constraint that might have been cribbed from Henry
Knox. But Marshall’s belated change of heart could not erase the principles
he had earlier established. Two years after Worcester, Chief Justice John
Catron of the Tennessee Supreme Court (soon to be a Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court) defied the Court’s decision and upheld state jurisdiction over
the Cherokee.195 Catron cited Marshall against Marshall: “In this conclusion
we are fortified by the great and well considered case of Johnson against
M’Intosh; the reasoning in which, by the same distinguished jurist, it must
be admitted, if not in direct opposition, is greatly in conflict with Worcester’s
case.”196
Worcester famously prompted a confrontation between Marshall and
Tennessee’s first congressman: now president Andrew Jackson. If Marshall
was a latter-day defender of Federalist constitutionalism, Jackson appears as
its antithesis, a populist whose impatience with law’s restraints was sharply
at odds with what Washington, Hamilton, and Knox had envisioned for the
new republic.197
The young Jackson had certainly been no fan of the Federalists and had
had particular contempt for the constitution of constraint. He mocked Knox
and others who thought that “humanity dictates” the pursuit of peace through
191. Id. at 573–74.
192. JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 309–10 (New York, O. Halstead
1828).
193. 6 REG. DEB. 1032 (1830) (statement of Rep. Thomas F. Foster); see also id. at 1117
(statement of Rep. Henry G. Lamar) (citing Johnson to argue that Georgia has control over its
own territory).
194. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
195. State v. Forman, 16 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 256, 277–78 (1835).
196. Id. at 287–88.
197. See generally J. M. OPAL, AVENGING THE PEOPLE: ANDREW JACKSON, THE RULE OF
LAW, AND THE AMERICAN NATION (2017).
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treaties.198 Congress “ought to Extend an Equal share of humanity to her
own Citizens,” Jackson fulminated, by “Punish[ing] the Barbarians for
Murdering her Innocent Citizens.”199 Reportedly, Jackson acted on this
belief by serving as a private in James Ore’s brutal destruction of the
Cherokee town of Nickajack.200
Yet Jackson and his ideology were less a repudiation of Federalist
constitutionalism than a fulfilment of some of its key legacies. Like the
Federalists, Jackson, too, drew his legal understandings from the Constitution
and Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations; he just consistently read them in a
single direction, to authorize and vindicate his uses of power rather than
restrain them.201 Similarly, for all his vaunted hostility toward the Federalist
financial machinery, Jackson proved remarkably adept at exploiting the
federal government’s expansive fiscal-military powers to rampage through
the borderlands. From Ore’s expedition through the slaughter of the Creek
Nation during the War of 1812 and the invasion of Spanish Florida during
the First Seminole War, Jackson deployed federal authority, federal soldiers,
federalized militias, and federal finance toward his own ends, defying the
limits his superiors sought to impose.202
The process euphemistically called “Indian Removal” that followed
Marshall’s abortive Worcester decision was thus the capstone to Jackson’s
exploitation of federal power. This brutal and incompetently executed mass
expulsion of Native peoples from their homelands came at states’ behest, but
federal authority underwrote and enacted it.203 Ultimately, the “Indian
Removal” cost the federal government $75 million, a sum historian Claudio
Saunt calculates as the equivalent of a trillion dollars in the present.204 He
estimates that, in peak years, 40 percent of every federal dollar went to fund
the deportation.205
Over the past few years, historians have hotly debated how straight a line
to draw between the policies adopted at the moment of the Constitution’s
creation and the brutal, even genocidal, practices against Indigenous peoples
that came to characterize Anglo-American imperialism.206 Lawyers have
198. Letter from Andrew Jackson to John McKee (May 16, 1794), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
ANDREW JACKSON, supra note 79, at 48, 48.
199. Id. at 48–49.
200. OPAL, supra note 197, at 93–102.
201. Id. at 5–14; see DEBORAH A. ROSEN, BORDER LAW: THE FIRST SEMINOLE WAR AND
AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 72–101 (2015).
202. OPAL, supra note 197, at 137–43.
203. See CLAUDIO SAUNT, UNWORTHY REPUBLIC: THE DISPOSSESSION OF NATIVE
AMERICANS AND THE ROAD TO INDIAN TERRITORY 117–41 (2020).
204. Id. at 308.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., JEFFREY OSTLER, SURVIVING GENOCIDE: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO BLEEDING KANSAS (2019); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1990); Gregory Evans Dowd, Indigenous Peoples Without the Republic, 104 J.
AM. HIST. 19 (2017); Benjamin Madley, Reexamining the American Genocide Debate:
Meaning, Historiography, and New Methods, 120 AM. HIST. REV. 98 (2015); Ostler, supra
note 152.
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slowly begun to enter this argument, too.207 In this debate, historians’ longstanding depictions of the Federalists as well-intentioned but ineffectual
policymakers, unable to thwart the Indian-hating whites of the borderlands,
appears at best unpersuasive and at worse an “effacement of U.S. settler
colonialism.”208
Part of the difficulty of this debate is that it seeks to identify a single core
to Federalist views. But no such core existed, as the Federalists, like others
in the early republic, embraced divergent positions. On the one hand, the
Federalists did not represent an egalitarian, anti-racist path not taken: their
views on Native peoples were condescending, thoroughly imperialist, and at
times exterminatory. On the other hand, their limited embrace of “Indian
rights” and autonomy was more than a mere sop to Native power; they
sincerely believed in these commitments. In this sense, their seemingly
contradictory efforts to guard Cherokee land while also forcibly seizing
Wyandot territory were both Federalist policies.
Also missing from this debate is politics. Whether valorized or
condemned, fixating on the Federalists and their views maintains them as the
key actors. In practice, though, more clout lay with Native leaders and
borderlands citizens, who made competing demands on the federal
government. Navigating between these claims, Knox, Washington, and other
Federalists sought, often fruitlessly, to placate both groups. The result was
that the federal government simultaneously embraced robust
acknowledgment of Native sovereignty and exterminatory anti-Indian
violence. These vacillations between the two strands of Federalist
constitutionalism underscore that, in the end, the Federalists were politicians,
if not particularly good ones.
This history suggests a broader point about the political and constitutional
history of the early republic. Usually, this period’s politics are narrated as a
struggle over the scope of federal power: Federalist (and later Whig)
nationalists pit against Republican (and later Democratic) defenders of
states’ rights and strict construction.209 This account depicts the parties’
frequent breaks from this ideological script—Jefferson reluctantly endorsing
the Louisiana Purchase or the Federalists plotting secession at Hartford—as
hypocrisies and ironic concessions to power.
But the meaning of federal authority in the early republic was not as
coherent or clear as this narrative posits. The enumeration in Article I,
Section 8 notwithstanding, the federal government was not for any particular
purpose. Rather, it was at once a tool, a resource, and a battleground for
competing views. As the two Federalist constitutional visions traced here
demonstrate, the Federalists were themselves inconsistent on federal power’s
207. See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2019); K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV.
1878 (2019).
208. Patrick Wolfe, Against the Intentional Fallacy: Legocentrism and Continuity in the
Rhetoric of Indian Dispossession, 36 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RSCH. J. 1, 4 (2012).
209. See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN
IMPERIO, 1776–1876 (2000).
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uses. These contradictions made space for those with their own
interpretations of the federal role, including Natives and territorial citizens,
who seized on different parts of the Federalist project for their own ends. In
the end, Native perspectives on the Constitution largely lost, while whites’
frontier constitutionalism prevailed. But this outcome reflected more than
Federalist betrayal. It was the overdetermined outcome of a system that
placed Native peoples on the outside, limiting their very real power to the
military and diplomatic realms, even as their opponents manipulated the
clout that politics out-of-doors and popular constitutionalism afforded them.

